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reimbursements or other payments after that date. RRA, §
13213(e).
24.  Lobbying Expense. Effective for amounts paid or
incurred after 1993, deductions are not allowed for amounts
paid or incurred in connection with influencing federal or
state legislation or any communication with designated
federal executive branch officials in an attempt to influence
the official actions or positions of those individuals. RRA, §
13222(a), amending I.R.C. § 162(e). An exception is
provided for attempts to influence legislative actions of a
“local council or similar governing body.” RRA, §
13222(a), amending I.R.C. § 162(e)(2).  A de minimis rule
is provided which exempts in-house lobbying expenditures
from the disallowance rule if the amount of such
expenditures for a taxable year do not exceed $2,000
(computed without taking into account general overhead
costs otherwise allowable to lobbying). RRA, § 13222(a),
amending I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(B).
25.  Charitable Gifts of Appreciated Property.  The
act repeals the AMT preference for charitable contributions
of appreciated real or personal property, tangible or
intangible. RRA, § 13171(a), amending I.R.C. § 57(a). The
repeal is effective for contributions made after June 30,
1992; for contributions of capital gain property which is not
tangible personal property, the repeal is effective for
contributions after December 31, 1992. RRA, § 13171(d).
26.  Travel by Spouse.  Effective for amounts paid or
incurred after December 31, 1993, the travel expenses of a
spouse, dependent or any other individual can be deducted
as a business expense only if (a) the accompanying person is
employed by the person providing the travel expense, (b)
there is a business purpose for the person’s presence, and (c)
the expenses are otherwise deductible. RRA, § 13272(a),
(b), amending I.R.C. § 274(m).
27.  Earned Income Credit.  The act increases the
maximum credit for 1994, 1995, and after; repeals the
young-child credit for workers with a child under one year
of age; and repeals the supplemental health insurance credit
for workers who pay health insurance premiums from after-
tax income. RRA, § 13131(a), amending I.R.C. § 32.
28.  Estimated Tax for Individuals.  The special rule,
applicable from 1992 to 1996, that denies the use of the 100
percent-of-last-year safe harbor is repealed for taxable years
beginning after 1993. For those with adjusted gross income
of more than $150,000, as shown on the return for the
preceding taxable year, the 100 percent of last year’s
liability safe harbor is modified to be a 110 percent of last
year’s liability safe harbor. RRA, § 13214(a), amending
I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1). The act does not change (a) the
availability of the 100 percent of last year’s liability safe
harbor for those with a preceding year’s adjusted gross
income of $150,000 or less and (b) the rule allowing an
individual to base estimated tax payments on 90 percent of
the tax shown on the return for the current year.
29.  Cancellation of Indebtedness Income.  The act
repeals the stock-for-debt exception (allowing insolvent
debtors to issue stock in satisfaction of debt without creating
cancellation of indebtedness income) effective for stock
transferred in satisfaction of a debt after December 31, 1994.
RRA, § 13226(a), amending I.R.C. § 108(e).  A bankrupt
or insolvent corporation may exclude from income all or a
portion of cancellation of indebtedness income created by
the transfer of its stock by reducing tax attributes.  The
amendments do not apply to stock transfers in satisfaction of
any indebtedness if the transfer is in a bankruptcy case filed
on or before December 31, 1993. RRA, § 13226(a)(3)(B).
30.  Tax Attributes Reduced in Discharge of
Indebtedness Calculations.  Effective for discharge of
indebtedness in taxable years beginning after December 31,
1993, the act adds additional tax attributes to the list of those
reduced from discharge of indebtedness including—(a)
minimum tax credits as of the beginning of the taxable year
immediately after the taxable year of the discharge, and (b)
passive activity loss and credit carryovers from the taxable
year of the discharge. RRA, § 13226(b), amending I.R.C. §
108(b)(2)(C).
31.  Transportation Tax. The 4.3 cents per gallon
increase in tax is a permanent excise tax imposed effective
October 1, 1993. RRA, § 13241. Gasoline and diesel fuel
used on farms for farming purposes is exempt from the tax.
32.  Alternative Minimum Tax. For tax years beginning
after December 31, 1992, a 26 percent rate applies to the
first $175,000 of an individual’s alternative minimum
taxable income over the exemption amount ($45,000 for
those who are married filing joint returns).  A 28 percent
rate applies above $175,000 of AMTI. RRA, § 13203(a),
amending I.R.C. § 55(b)(1).  The corporate AMT rate
remains at 20 percent.
33.  Partnerships. The act repeals the special treatment
of payments made for unrealized receivables (other than
unbilled amounts and accounts receivable) for all partners.
These amounts are treated as made in exchange for the
partner’s interest in partnership property. RRA, § 13262(a),
amending I.R.C. § 736.  The law also repeals payments
made to a retired or deceased partner for goodwill and
unrealized receivables. Such payments are treated as made
in exchange for the partner’s interest in partnership property
and not as a distributive share or guaranteed payment that
could give rise to a deduction. RRA, § 13262(b), amending
I.R.C. § 751.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES-ALM § 13.03[5].
The debtor had leased some trucks to the creditor under a
lease/purchase agreement. After the debtor had filed for
Chapter 12, the debtor breached the agreement and
repossessed the trucks with the intent to sell them for the
benefit of the bankruptcy estate. After the repossession, the
debtor converted the case to Chapter 7. Before the Chapter 7
trustee was appointed, the debtor allowed a third party to use
the trucks without cost. The creditor obtained possession of
the trucks through an abandonment proceeding and filed an
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administrative expense for damage to the trucks during the
time the trucks were used by the third party. The trustee
objected to the claim, arguing that the debtor had no
authority to allow the trucks to be used after the case was
converted to Chapter 7. The court allowed the expense as a
priority administrative claim because the repossession and
use of the trucks was done for the benefit of the estate. In re
J.A.V. Ag., Inc., 154 B.R. 923 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1993).
The debtors had operated a trucking business on land
which included wetlands. Some drums of petroleum
products were disposed of on those wetlands and the EPA
had ordered the debtor to remove the drums. After the
debtor had filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the estate sold the
property to a third party. The EPA again found the same
drums on the property and ordered the purchaser to clean up
the area. The purchaser filed a claim for the incurred
cleanup costs and the estimated future cleanup costs as an
administrative claim against the estate. The court held that
the estimated future cleanup costs would not be allowed
because of their contingent nature unless the purchaser can
show that it could qualify as an innocent landowner under
CERCLA. In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d
915 (1st Cir. 1993), aff’g in part and rem’g in part, 126
B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS.
HOUSEHOLD GOODS. The debtors included a piano
and bench in their list of exempt household goods. The
trustee objected to the exemption because the piano was not
a household good. The court compared the piano to a stereo
that the debtors also claimed as exempt but was not objected
to by the trustee. The court held that Wyo. Stat. § 1-20-
106(a)(iii) allowed the debtors to choose which pieces of
household furnishing were to be included in exempt
household goods, subject to the $4,000 limitation. In re
Lindell-Heasler, 154 B.R. 748 (D. Wyo. 1992).
TAX REFUNDS. The debtors, husband and wife, each
claimed $800 of an income tax refund as exempt, $400 as
exempt under Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(4)(A) (cash on
hand) and $400 as exempt under Ohio Rev. Code §
2329.66(A)(17) (wild card). The trustee objected to the
exemptions of the wife more than two years after knowledge
of the wife’s claim of exemption. The trustee argued that
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992) did not
apply to bar the untimely objection because the wife had no
interest or ownership of the refund since the wife did not
have any income subject to tax in the year to which the
refund applied. The court held that Taylor barred any
untimely objection to a claimed exemption. The court noted
that if the claimed exemption is insufficiently made, e.g. too
ambiguous or indefinite, the time limit for objections by the
trustee runs only from the point that the trustee has sufficient
knowledge of the specific property claimed as exempt. In re
Zimmer, 154 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
    CHAPTER 12
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES-ALM § 13.03[5].
The Chapter 12 debtor had leased farm equipment from a
creditor. After filing the petition, the debtor ceased using the
equipment but the equipment remained in the debtor’s
possession. The creditor sought to compel the debtor to
assume or reject the lease and the debtor eventually rejected
the lease. The creditor sought an administrative expense
claim for the rent for the period from the petition to the date
of rejection of the lease. The court held that because the
debtor did not use the equipment after the petition date, the
estate received no benefit from the equipment and the rent
claim could not receive administrative expense priority. In
re Templeton, 154 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
CLAIMS. The IRS filed its claim for taxes in the wrong
district court office and did not discover its error until after
the bar date for claims in the debtor’s Chapter 13 case.  The
IRS sought permission to file the late claim or to extend the
filing date for the claim based on excusable neglect under
Bankr. Rule 9006(b)(1).  The trustee objected to the claim or
any extension of time to file the claim as barred under
Bankr. Rule 9006(c) because excusable neglect is not a
permitted reason for allowing an exception to the 90 day
claim rule. The court held that the claim was barred because
Rule 9006(c) did not allow an exception for excusable
neglect. The court held that Pioneer Investment Services Co.
v. Brunswick Associates Ltd., 113 S.Ct. 1489 (1993) (late
claim in Chapter 11 allowed for excusable neglect), applied
only to Chapter 11 cases. Matter of Jones, 154 B.R. 816
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The IRS sought a determination that the
debtor’s taxes for 1983 through 1985 were nondischargeable
under Section 523(a)(1)(C) because the debtor willfully
attempted to evade or defeat the taxes for those years. The
debtor did not file any tax returns for 1983 through 1985;
instead, the debtor transferred assets to a foreign trust,
created sham loan agreements with himself to create interest
deductions, and backdated the loan agreements to create
deductions in prior years. The debtor also sought advice
from tax protesters on tax evasion techniques. The court
held that the taxes were nondischargeable because the
evidence demonstrated that the debtor willfully and
knowingly attempted to evade payment of the taxes. In re
Boch, 154 B.R. 647 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4]. Under
the decedent’s will, most of the estate passed to a charitable
organization. The executor obtained a state probate court
ruling that administrative expenses were to be paid from
estate income generated during the estate administration.
The executor claimed the administrative expenses as a
deduction on the estate fiduciary income tax return. The
court held that the value of the gross estate which passed to
the charitable organization was the amount remaining after
payment of administrative expenses and that estate post-
death income could not be used to increase, directly or
indirectly, the estate for purposes of the charitable
deduction. Burke v. U.S., 994 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
CREDIT FOR PRIOR TRANSFERS-ALM § 5.04[5].
Three cases, Est. of Street v. Comm’r, 974 F.2d 723 (6th
Cir. 1992; Est. of Whittle v. Comm’r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,141 (7th Cir. 1993); and Est. of Richardson v.
Comm’r, 89 T.C. 1193 (1987), have held that the value of a
prior testamentary transfer is not reduced by the interest paid
on deferred payment of estate taxes. In response to these
decisions, the IRS has revoked Rev. Rul. 82-6, 1982-1 C.B.
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137 which held that the value of a residuary charitable
bequest is reduced by the interest payments on deferred
estate tax payments from the residuary estate.  The IRS also
modified Rev. Rul. 66-233, 1966-2 C.B. 428 to hold that
prior residuary bequests are not reduced by interest
payments on obligations payable from the residuary estate.
The IRS also modified Rev. Rul. 73-98, 1973-1 C.B. 407 to
hold that a residuary charitable bequest is not reduced by
interest payments on obligations payable from the residuary
estate.  The IRS also modified Rev. Rul. 80-159, 1980-1
C.B. 206 to hold that a residuary marital bequest is not
reduced by interest payments on taxes even if state law
requires payment of the tax and interest from the marital
bequest. Rev. Rul. 93-48, I.R.B. 1993-25, 9.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].  The
decedent had created two irrevocable trusts with the
surviving spouse as remainder beneficiary. The first trust
provided for all income to be distributed to the surviving
spouse with a remainder to their children. The trust did not
specify the frequency of the income payments, but the IRS
ruled that under state law the payments would be required to
be made at least annually; therefore, the first trust qualified
for the marital deduction as QTIP. The second trust included
three subtrusts, a QTIP trust, a QTIP-GSTT trust and a
marital trust.  The QTIP and QTIP-GSTT trusts were
identical except that the estate made a reverse QTIP election
for the QTIP-GSTT trust. The IRS ruled that these two trusts
were eligible for the marital deduction. The marital trust
originally provided that the surviving spouse had a lifetime
special power to appoint trust corpus to the descendants of
the decedent and a testamentary general power of
appointment over trust corpus. The surviving spouse timely
disclaimed the lifetime special power of appointment. The
IRS ruled that after the disclaimer, the marital trust was
eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9329025, April
28, 1993.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. At the death of the
decedent‘s predeceased spouse, the decedent received a life
estate in the residuary of the predeceased spouse’s estate.
The will provided that the decedent could “do [with the
property] as she pleases” but could not dispose of the
property except to meet the decedent’s needs for health,
education, support and maintenance.  A District Court held
that the decedent’s life estate was not eligible for the marital
deduction because the decedent did not have an unlimited
power to use or dispose of the property. Duvall v. Comm’r,
65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 12,342 (D. Ky. 1965). An IRS
audit concluded that the decedent had an unlimited power of
appointment over the property and included the life estate in
the decedent’s gross estate. The Tax Court held that the life
estate was not includible in the decedent’s gross estate
because the decedent’s power to dispose of the property was
limited to the decedent’s needs for health, education, support
and maintenance. Est. of Duvall v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-319.
At the decedent’s death, the decedent was the beneficiary
of two trusts, a marital trust and a family trust. The decedent
had an unlimited right to receive the corpus of the marital
trust and the right to receive up to 5 percent of the corpus of
the family trust if the marital trust was exhausted. At the
decedent’s death, the marital trust was not exhausted. The
IRS argued that 5 percent of the family trust corpus was
includible in the decedent’s gross estate because at the
decedent’s death, the decedent held the power to exhaust the
marital trust and to receive the 5 percent interest. The IRS
further argued that Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) required that
any contingency relating to a decedent’s power to receive
property be out of the decedent’s control in order for the
property to be excluded from the gross estate. The court
refused to accept the IRS criteria but held that the
contingency must not be illusory and have some significant
nontax consequence. In this case, the estate failed  to
demonstrate any significant nontax consequence for the
contingency, exhaustion of the marital trust, which would
entitle the decedent to the 5 percent interest. Est. of Kurz v.
Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 3 (1993).
Three irrevocable trusts were established for the
grandchildren of the settlor. The settlor's son and an
independent trustee were the trustees of each trust.  Under
the trust, a trustee who was a beneficiary could not
participate in trustee decisions for distribution of trust
income or corpus, nor could a trustee participate in decisions
for distributions to beneficiaries for which the trustee had a
support obligation. The son trustee or successor family
member trustees had the power to remove the independent
trustee for one of several “causes” listed in the trust. The
IRS ruled that the son trustee and the possible successor
family member trustees did not have a general power of
appointment over the trust corpus so as to include the trust
corpus in their gross estates. Ltr. Rul. 9328015, April 16,
1993.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].  The
decedent’s estate included a farm which contained
pastureland and timberland. The executor elected to value
the farm under the special use valuation rules and included
in the election appraisal the value of one other property in
the area which contained pastureland and timberland.
However, the comparable land was cash rented to a lessee
who had no right to the timberland except for access to a
reservoir for irrigation.  The comparable land was recently
sold with the pastureland sold separately from the
timberland. The property tax on the estate farm did not
include any value for the timber, but treated forested land as
bare land. The IRS ruled that the comparable land listed by
the executor was not sufficiently comparable to be used to
determine the entire special use value of the estate farm;
therefore, the multiple factors of I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(8) must
be used to value the farm. Under these factors, the cash
lease, the property tax assessment and the sale of the
comparable pastureland were relevant for determining the
special use value of the estate pastureland.  The sale of the
comparable timberland would be relevant if the method of
timber harvesting on that land was similar to the method
historically used on the estate timberland.  Ltr. Rul
9328004, Mar. 31, 1993.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3].  The taxpayers
transferred a vacation house to a qualified personal
residence trust. Also situated on the land was a small cottage
used as a guest house for family members and their friends.
The occupants of the cottage did not pay rent and have no
right of continuing occupancy. The IRS ruled that the use of
the cottage as a guest house did not disqualify the main
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house as a residence of the taxpayers under I.R.C. §
2702(a)(3)(A)(ii). Ltr. Rul. 9328040, April 21, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  The taxpayer
purchased a farm for $110,000, with $30,000 down and a
mortgage of $80,000. The taxpayer donated a remainder
interest in the farm to a charitable organization but remained
liable for the full mortgage. The taxpayer planned to
renovate the farm. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was
eligible for a charitable deduction for the remainder interest
in the difference between the fair market value of the farm
and the outstanding mortgage. In addition, a further
charitable deduction is available for each mortgage payment
to the extent of the reminder interest in each payment on the
loan principal. If the taxpayer adds property to the farm in
the renovation which is considered real property, the
remainder interest in that additional property is also eligible
for the charitable deduction; however, any personal property
added is not eligible for the deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9329017,
April 26, 1993.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM § 4.02[15].
The IRS has issued a notice that taxpayers who acquired
indebtedness on or after March 21, 1991 and before
December 28, 1992, may rely on the proposed regulations,
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-2, for determining the application
of I.R.C. § 108(e)(4) to the debt. See 4 Agric. Law Digest 14
(1993) for discussion of the final regulations. Notice 93-40,
I.R.B. 1993-26, 10.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1]. The
taxpayers claimed an interest expense deduction from the
installment sale of a condominium.  The taxpayers claimed
that the sale was completed in June 1983, the date the
contract of sale was signed.  The contract provided that the
deed would be placed in escrow until the settlement date in
December 1983. The condominium was not yet constructed
in June 1983. The taxpayers became liable for property taxes
as of the contract date. Upon default of the taxpayers, the
sellers could retain the downpayment and recover the
condominium. The taxpayers argued that under state law
title passed on the date of the contract, more than six months
before the payment of the first installment, and the
installment method of reporting was available to the
taxpayers.  The court held that no title passed on the signing
of the contract because the taxpayers had no right to specific
performance upon the breach of the contract by the sellers
but could only recover their downpayment. The court held
that the sale did not occur until the settlement date in
December 1983; therefore, the interest deduction was not
allowed under I.R.C. § 483 because the first installment,
paid in December 1983 was not received more than six
months after the sale. Note: the case was decided under the
pre-1984 version of  I.R.C. § 483.  Williams v. Comm'r,
93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,422 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1992-269.
INSURANCE .  The taxpayer purchased long-term
disability insurance through the taxpayer’s employer. The
insurance premium was paid entirely by the taxpayer using
after-tax dollars. The taxpayer became disabled and received
benefits under the policy. The IRS ruled that the benefit
payments were excludable from gross income. Ltr. Rul.
9329009, April 22, 1993.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES.  The taxpayers
formed a limited liability company (LLC) under the Illinois
Limited Liability Act (the Act). The IRS ruled that the LLC
would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC lacked
the corporate characteristic of continuity of life since the
state LLC law and the LLC agreement required the consent
of all members to continue the partnership after a
terminating event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate
characteristic of transferability of interests because the Act
provided that if any other member objected to the sale or
assignment of a member’s interest in the LLC, the transferee
or assignee had no right to participate in the management of
the LLC.  Rev. Rul. 93-49, I.R.B. 1993-25, 11.
The taxpayers formed a limited liability company (LLC)
under the West Virginia Limited Liability Act (the Act). The
IRS ruled that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership
because (1) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life since the state LLC law and the LLC
agreement required the consent of all members to continue
the partnership after a terminating event, and (2) the LLC
lacked the corporate characteristic of transferability of
interests because the Act provided that if any other member
objected to the sale or assignment of a member’s interest in
the LLC, the transferee or assignee had no right to
participate in the management of the LLC.  Rev. Rul. 93-50,
I.R.B. 1993-25, 13.
The taxpayers formed a limited liability company (LLC)
under the Florida Limited Liability Act (the Act). The IRS
ruled that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership because
(1) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life since the state LLC law and the LLC agreement
required the consent of all members to continue the
partnership after a terminating event, and (2) the LLC lacked
the corporate characteristic of transferability of interests
because the Act provided that if any other member objected
to the sale or assignment of a member’s interest in the LLC,
the transferee or assignee had no right to participate in the
management of the LLC.  Rev. Rul. 93-53, I.R.B. 1993-26,
17.
A general partnership was converted to an LLC. None of
the LLC members was a C corporation. The LLC had been
ruled a partnership for federal income tax purposes and
sought a ruling that it could use the cash method of reporting
income. All of the members participated in the daily
business of the LLC and, although the LLC was managed by
an executive committee, several actions of the committee
required a vote of all of the members. The memberships in
the LLC were not offered, nor were planned to be ever
offered, for sale in an offering required to be registered
under state or federal law.  The IRS ruled that the LLC was
not a tax shelter, under I.R.C. §§ 461(i)(3)(A),
6662(d)(2)(ii), required to use the accrual method of
accounting.  Ltr. Rul. 9328005, Dec. 21, 1992.
See Harl, “Limited Liability Companies,” (three parts) 4
Agric. Law Digest, 93, 101 , 109 (1993).
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TERMINATION. The taxpayer was a partner in a
partnership which owned an apartment building. The
building was sold in 1980 at foreclosure, resulting in
ordinary gain and long-term capital gain to the partnership
which passed to the partners in 1980. The partnership
terminated in 1980; however, the partnership retained
sufficient funds to pay some remaining obligations in 1981.
The taxpayer argued that the partnership terminated in 1980
and that the partner’s loss from the liquidation of the
partnership interest could be used to offset the gain
recognized from the foreclosure sale. The court held that
the partnership terminated in 1981 when all remaining
assets were either paid or distributed. Goulder v. U.S., 93-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,421 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
The taxpayer’s spouse died at the age of 45 and the
taxpayer received a lump sum distribution from the
decedent’s qualified pension plan and elected to use the
five-year averaging method for determining the tax on the
distribution. The court held that the five-year averaging
method was not allowed because the employee, the
decedent, had not reached age 59 1/2 at the time of the
distribution. Cebula v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 5 (1993).
RENT DEDUCTION. The taxpayers, husband and
wife, owned real property as tenants by the entirety. The
property was rented to the husband's sole proprietorship
business. The taxpayers filed a joint return. The court held
that the taxpayer must claim one-half of the rent as income
and the husband could deduct one-half of the rent payments
as a rent deduction on Schedule C for the business. Cox v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-326.
TRUSTS-ALM Ch. 8. In 1945 an irrevocable trust was
established to which shares of common stock in two
corporations were transferred. The trust had individuals as
lifetime income beneficiaries with the remainder to pass in
trust in perpetuity to charitable organizations. All capital
gains realized by the trust were to be allocated to trust
corpus under state law. No additional stock was transferred
to the trusts but the original shares were sold and new
shares in other corporations were purchased. The trust
planned to make another sale and purchase of stock and
sought a ruling that the trust was eligible for a deduction for
the capital gains realized on the sale of the stock. The IRS
ruled that all stock obtained from the sales and trades of the
original stock would be treated as acquired when the
original stock was transferred to the trust. Because the stock
was considered permanently set aside for the charitable
organization, the trust was eligible for a deduction for the
capital gains realized from the sale or trade of its stock. Ltr.
Rul. 9329013, April 23, 1993.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
LANDLORD’S LIEN-ALM § 13.01[5]. The debtor
had purchased a farm and had assumed the seller’s loan
from the plaintiff which was secured by a deed on the farm.
The debtor leased the farm to the defendant. The debtor
defaulted on the loan and the plaintiff sought a distraint
upon the defendant’s crops under Ga. Code § 44-14-341
(landlord’s lien). The court held that because the plaintiff
was not the landlord of the defendant at the time the crops
were sought to be distrained, the plaintiff had no standing to
bring the action. South Central Farm Credit v. V.T.
Properties, 430 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
REPOSSESSION.  The defendant attempted a “self-
help” repossession of collateral on the plaintiff’s farm after
the plaintiff defaulted on loans secured by the collateral.
The owner and her daughter objected to the repossession
and the daughter was injured in the process.  The court held
that once the owner and daughter objected to the
repossession, the defendant became a trespasser and was
required to withdraw and the failure to withdraw and
subsequent injury to the daughter justified punitive
damages to be awarded. Smith v. John Deere Co., 614
N.E.2d 1148 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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